Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2003

Bryan J. Whatley v. Bruce E. Chapman, Ceri
Chapman, James L. Christensen, and Does I-V :
Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James Christensen; Corbridge, Baird & Christensen; attorney for appellee.
Timothy Miguel Willardson; attorney for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Whatley v. Chapman, No. 20030481 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4380

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRYAN J. WHATLEY, an individual,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case No. 20030481-CA
BRUCE E. CHAPMAN, CERI
CHAPMAN, JAMES L.
CHRISTENSEN, and DOES I-V,
Defendants/Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLEES
Appeal from a ruling of the Honorable Claudia Laycock
Judge of the Fourth District Court

Timothy Miguel Willardson,
10885 S. State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801) 576-1400
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant

James L. Christensen, USB No. A0639
Christopher G. Jessop, USB No. 8542
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 534-0909
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
U«n Court of ApDoals

DEC 3 t 2003
PclUi&tiB £fc^ir«

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRYAN J. WHATLEY, an individual,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.

Case No. 20030481-CA

BRUCE E. CHAPMAN, CERI
CHAPMAN, JAMES L.
CHRISTENSEN, and DOES I-V,
Defendants/ Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLEES
Appeal from a ruling of the Honorable Claudia Laycock
Judge of the Fourth District Court

Timothy Miguel Willardson,
10885 S. State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801) 576-1400
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant

James L. Christensen, USB No. A0639
Christopher G. Jessop, USB No. 8542
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 534-0909
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

JURISDICTION

1

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

1

RESPONSE TO MR. WHATLEY'S STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

3

ARGUMENT

5

I.

H.

THE TRIAL COURT'S NOVEMBER 12, 2003 ORDER IS
HARMLESS ERROR AND HELPS MR. WHATLEY
IN ANY CASE

5

THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY ORDERED MR. WHATLEY
TO SUBMIT HIS CLAIMS TO ARBITRATION

8

A.

B.

C.
D.

The Agreement contains and enforceable
arbitration clause

8

An action for breach of contract arises under the contract
itself

10

All of Mr. Whatley's other causes of action are inextricably
linked to the Agreement

14

Mr. Whatley's fraud allegation is not a "get out of arbitration
free" card

16

1.

2.

Mr. Whatley has no basis for his fraud claim against
Mr. Christensen

18

Mr. Whatley's fraud cause of action against the Chapmans
is just another allegation of breach of contract
22
l

E.
III.

IV.

The Pacific Development case cited by Mr. Whatley is
inapposite to this case

23

THE COURT PROPERLY TREATED APPELLEE'S MOTION
TO DISMISS AS A MOTION TO DISMISS, NOT A MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

25

THE COURT'S DENIAL OF THE RULE 56(f) MOTION
WAS PROPER

27

A.

B.

Discovery is already occurring in the arbitration proceeding.
Hence, Mr. Whatley will not be prejudiced by the denial
of his Rule 56(f) motion

27

Rule 56(f) is not a fishing licence

28

CONCLUSION

30

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

32

ADDENDUM
Order Granting Defendants' Motions and Denying Plaintiff's
Rule 56(f) Motion

Exhibit A

Ruling on Defendant Chapmans' Motion to Dismiss Cross-Claim
and Motion to Compel Arbitration

Exhibit B

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Central Florida Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Associates,
2002 UT 3, 40 P.3d

3,9

Heathman v. Hatch, 372 P.2d 990 (Utah 1962)

17, 29

Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Assoc, v. Foothills Water Co., 942 P.2d 305
(Utah 1996)

5

Pacific Development v. Orton, 2001 UT 36, 23 P.3d 1035 (Utah 2001)

23, 24

Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864, 868 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
Semenov v. Hill, 1999 UT 58, 982 P.2d 578

14, 22, 23
17, 18, 19, 22

St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194
(Utah 1991)
United States v. Utah Const. Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966)

26
11, 12, 13

Statutes:
18 U.S.C. § 1030
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-3
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-4(l)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-108(l)

16
1
16
1, 3, 6, 9
1,9

Other Authorities:
7 Am Jur 2d, Attorneys at Law, § 249
Commercial Rules of Arbitration, Rule R-23
iii

29
27, 28

Restatement, Contracts 2d, § 1

10

Restatement, Contracts 2d, § 235(2)

10,11

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)(7)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 9(b)

2
1, 16, 17

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(6)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(f)

4, 25, 26, 27
4, 5, 27, 28, 29, 30

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.1 (Competence)

30

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.3 (Diligence)

30

iv

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-4(l) (Repealed May 15, 2003):
The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an arbitration

agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is raised concerning the
existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of the matters covered by the agreement,
the court shall determine those issues and order or deny arbitration accordingly.
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-108(l) (Effective May 15, 2003):
(1) On motion of a person showing an agreement to arbitrate and alleging another

person's refusal to arbitrate pursuant to the agreement: (a) if the refusing party does not
appear or does not oppose the motion, the court shall order the parties to arbitrate; and (b)
if the refusing party opposes the motion, the court shall proceed summarily to decide the
issue and order the parties to arbitrate unless it finds that there is no enforceable agreement
to arbitrate.
3.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 9(b):
In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake

shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind
of a person may be averred generally.
1

RESPONSE TO MR, WHATLEY'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires Mr. Whatley to
include in his opening brief "A statement of facts relevant to the issues presented for
review . . . supported by citations to the record. . . . " Instead of setting forth any facts
in his brief supported by citations to the record, Mr. Whatley refers the Court to his
anemic statement of the case and his amended complaint. The propriety of such a
reference in light of the requirements of Rule 24(a)(7) is questionable at best. More
importantly, however, Mr. Whatley has omitted two important facts between his statement
of the case and his two-sentence statement of the facts. Those facts are:
1.

After operating World-Wide Photo for a year Mr. Whatley abandoned the

business in April 2002 and refused to continue making payments to the Chapmans as
required by the Agreement. (Appellant's Addendum at 5,118; see also Record, at 125.)
2.

After receiving very short notice from Mr. Whatley that he was abandoning

the business, Mr. Chapman took over operating World-Wide Photo as trustee/gratuitous
bailee on behalf of Mr. Whatley and at Mr. Whatley's request. Mr. Chapman has been
operating the business in that capacity ever since. (Appellant's Addendum at 5, % IS; see
also Record, at 140.)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

The trial court's November 12, 2003 modification of the April 2003
order is harmless error and helps Mr. Whately in any case.

Mr. Whately's complaint about the trial court's November 12, 2003 modification
of its April 2003 order is purely procedural. The November 12 modification is harmless
error and actually helps Mr. Whatley as it obviates the necessity for him to file any further
lawsuits seeking judicial review of the arbitration award, should he be dissatisfied with that
award.
II.

The trial court correctly ordered Mr. Whatley to submit his claims to
arbitration.

The Utah Arbitration Act and Utah case law favor arbitration. Section 78-31a-4(l)
of the Utah Code Annotated states, in relevant part, "The court, upon motion of any party
showing the existence of an arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate." In
addition, the Utah Supreme Court said, in Central Florida Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest
Associates, 2002 UT 3, \ 16, 40 P.3d, "We interpret the agreement [between the parties]
keeping in mind our policy of encouraging arbitration." The agreement between Mr.
Whatley and the Chapmans requires that they submit to arbitration, "In the event of a
dispute under [the] agreement." (Appellant's Addendum at 33, 1f 9(m); see also Record,
at 46.) Mr. Whatley's argument that none of his causes of action "arise under" the
Agreement flies in the face of logic.
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Regardless of the labels applied to Mr. Whatley's causes of action, each of the
causes of action boil down to general allegations that the Chapmans breached the
Agreement. Mr. Whatley has also failed to plead fraud with particularity against Mr.
Christensen and the Chapmans. Hence, Mr. Whatley's fraud allegations do not absolve
him of his obligation to arbitrate and the lower court was correct to compel Mr. Whatley
to submit all of his claims to arbitration.
III.

The lower court properly treated the Chapmans' motion to dismiss as a
motion to dismiss and not a motion for summary judgment.

Next, the lower court properly treated the Chapmans' motion to dismiss as a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and not a motion for summary judgment. Judge Laycock
ignored the affidavit of Bruce Chapman, accepted the allegations contained in the
complaint as true and resolved all reasonable inferences in favor of Mr. Whatley. Those
facts and inferences are: 1) that Mr. Whately and the Chapmans entered into an agreement
with respect to the sale of World-Wide Photo; 2) that the Chapmans have not done all that
the Agreement requires of them; and 3) paragraph 9(m) of the Agreement requires the
parties to submit "any action" to arbitration in the event of a dispute. There is no way to
construe the contractual obligation to arbitrate in favor of Mr. Whately and not order the
parties to attend arbitration.
IV.

The lower court properly denied Mr. Whatley's Rule 56(f) motion.

Finally, the lower court properly denied Mr. Whatley's Rule 56(f) motion. Mr.
Whatley has the right to do discovery in the arbitration proceeding. Hence, he is not
4

prejudiced by the denial of his motion. In addition, Rule 56(f) is not a fishing licence that
authorizes Mr. Whatley to glibly throw out words like fraud and then grope around trying
to find facts to support his allegations. The purpose of discovery is to obtain evidence that
supports clearly-stated allegations, not to try to create facts out of thin air as to support
previously alleged causes of action.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S NOVEMBER 12, 2003 ORDER IS HARMLESS
ERROR AND HELPS MR. WHATLEY IN ANY CASE.
Mr. Whatley's first argument is that the trial court improperly modified its April
29, 2003 order by issuing a new decision on November 12, 2003, during the pendency of
this appeal. The general rule in Utah is that "the trial court is divested of jurisdiction over
a case while it is under advisement on appeal." Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Assoc.
v. Foothills Water Co., 942 P.2d 305, 306 (Utah 1996). It thus appears that the trial court
erred in issuing its November 12 ruling. However, Mr. Whatley makes no attempt to
explain to this Court what the November 12 ruling is, how that ruling came about, or why
it is troublesome. Mr. Whatley simply says, "[Sjince the lower court lost jurisdiction
approximately five months ago, that court's latest documents are void." (Appellant's
brief, at 5.) What Mr. Whatley fails to explain is that the November 12 ruling came as
a direct result of Mr. Whatley's own actions. This Court deserves an explanation.
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On April 29, 2003, Judge Lay cock of the Fourth District Court issued an order
dismissing Mr. Whatley 's claims against the Chapmans and Mr. Christensen. Specifically,
paragraphs 17 and 18 of Judge Laycock's order say:
117 Defendants' motion to compel arbitration is granted, and, pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-4(l), the Court orders the Plaintiff and Defendants
to submit all of their claims with respect to the Agreement, including all of
Plaintiff's causes of action raised in the complaint, to arbitration.
f 18 The Court has discretion under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-4 to dismiss
or stay this lawsuit pending the outcome of arbitration. Given the Court's
findings, the lawsuit is hereby dismissed as all of Plaintiff's claims arise
under the contract between Plaintiff and the Chapmans, and are subject to a
valid, binding arbitration clause. (Emphasis added.)
(Addendum, Exhibit A.) Hence, rather than stay the lawsuit, Judge Laycock dismissed
the parties and sent them and all of their claims to arbitration pursuant to their written
agreement.
Notwithstanding Judge Laycock's order that Mr. Whatley submit all of the claims
raised in his complaint to arbitration, Mr. Whately re-filed the exact same claims with the
fourth district court on July 31, 2003 in the form of a cross claim against the Chapmans
in a separate lawsuit called MM Property Management L. C. v. World-Wide Photo, Inc.
et.al., Civil No. 030400447. As it happened, the MM Property case was also assigned to
Judge Laycock, who had ordered Mr. Whatley into arbitration in April 2003. In response
to Mr. Whatley's cross claim, the Chapmans essentially re-filed the motion to dismiss and
motion to compel arbitration that they filed in the original Whatley v. Chapman lawsuit.
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On November 12, 2003, Judge Laycock issued a ruling in the MM Property case
staying Mr. Whatley's cross claim against the Chapmans, but again ordering Mr. Chapman
to submit his cross claims to arbitration. (A certified copy of Judge Laycock's order in
the MM Property case is attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit B.) Thus, Judge Laycock
chose to stay Mr. Whatley's cross claims during the pendency of the arbitration in the MM
Property case where she had previously chosen to dismiss the Whatley v. Chapman lawsuit
altogether. In order to harmonize the two opinions, Judge Laycock incidentally issued a
revised order in the Whatley v. Chapman case, also on November 12, 2003, that was
consistent with the MM Property result by reasserting the court's jurisdiction over the
original case during the pendency of the arbitration. It is this November 12, 2003 order
that Mr. Whatley complains about. {See Appellant's Addendum, at 153-156.)
If the lower court erred in issuing the November 12 order, then it is harmless error.
In truth, Mr. Whatley does not complain about the substance of Judge Laycock's
November 12 order. Indeed it would be foolish for him to do so because the result helps
him; the court retains jurisdiction over Mr. Whatley's lawsuit during arbitration. Hence,
Mr. Whatley need not file a new lawsuit or pay additional fees in order to have a judge
review the arbitration award if he does not like that award. Furthermore, the ruling came
about as a direct result of Mr. Whatley's re-filing of his original claims against the
Chapmans. Thus, although Mr. Whatley makes noise about the propriety of the lower
court's revised ruling, Mr. Whatley really has nothing to say. This issue is nothing more
7

than legal smoke and mirrors; Mr. Whatley offers no substantive argument on the issue
nor does he suggest a solution to the perceived problem, or even explain to the Court why
the November 12 order is a problem. The Court should therefore disregard Mr. Whatley's
assertion that the lower court improperly issued its November 12 order.
II. THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY ORDERED MR. WHATLEY TO
SUBMIT HIS CLAIMS TO ARBITRATION.
The second issue raised by Mr. Whatley is whether the lower court exceeded the
scope of the arbitration clause in the Agreement by ordering Mr. Whatley to submit all of
his claims to arbitration. Just as he did in the lower court, Mr. Whatley continues to
distort the plain meaning of the Agreement, not to mention Utah law, by arguing that none
of his claims "arise under" the contract and are thus not subject to arbitration. Before
debunking Mr. Whatley's argument, however, it is important to understand what the
Agreement says and how Utah courts view arbitration clauses.
A.

The Agreement contains an enforceable arbitration clause.
Paragraph 9(m) of the Agreement reads as follows:
In the event of a dispute under this agreement, the parties agree that any
action brought shall be submitted to binding arbitration in accordance with
the rules of the American Arbitration Association. Such arbitration need not
be conducted by the American Arbitration Association, even though it would
follow their rules. Arbitration proceedings shall be brought in Utah County,
Utah, and not elsewhere.

(Appellant's Addendum at 33, % 9(m).) Eight months after Mr. Whatley abandoned
World-Wide Photo and stopped making payments to the Chapmans, Mr. Chapman
8

commenced arbitration proceedings with the American Arbitration Association pursuant
to paragraph 9(m) of the Agreement. (Record, at 92; see also Appellant's Addendum at
78.) Rather than answer the arbitration demand, Mr. Whatley filed the above-captioned
case in the Fourth Judicial District for the State of Utah, in direct violation of paragraph
9(m). Hence the Chapmans filed a motion to compel Mr. Whatley to submit to arbitration.
(Record, at 122.)
The Chapmans' motion was based on § 78-31a-4(l) of the Utah Arbitration Act,
which says:
The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an arbitration
agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is raised
concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of the
matters covered by the agreement, the court shall determine those issues and
order or deny arbitration accordingly.1
Clearly, the Utah Arbitration Act requires arbitration where there is an agreement to
arbitrate. The Utah Supreme Court favors arbitration as well. In Central Florida
Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Associates, 2002 UT 3, 40 P.3d, the Utah Supreme Court

^his is the version of the Utah Arbitration Act that was in effect on January 10,
2003, when the Chapmans filed their motion to compel arbitration. On May 15, 2003,
a new Arbitration Act took effect. The corresponding provision in the new Arbitration
Act is found at Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-108(l), which reads as follows:
(1) On motion of a person showing an agreement to arbitrate and alleging
another person's refusal to arbitrate pursuant to the agreement: (a) if the refusing party
does not appear or does not oppose the motion, the court shall order the parties to
arbitrate; and (b) if the refusing party opposes the motion, the court shall proceed
summarily to decide the issue and order the parties to arbitrate unless it finds that there
is no enforceable agreement to arbitrate.
9

said, with respect to interpreting arbitration agreements, "we interpret the agreement
keeping in mind our policy of encouraging arbitration. 'It is the policy of the law in Utah
to interpret contracts in favor of arbitration, 'in resolution of disputes when the parties
have agreed not to litigate."" (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Id., at f 16. After
considering Mr. Whatley's complaint in light of the arbitration agreement, Judge Lay cock
ordered Mr. Whatley into arbitration, consistent with the Utah Arbitration Act and Utah's
policy of encouraging arbitration. Unhappy with that result, Mr. Whatley is still trying
to get out of his obligation to arbitrate.
B.

An action for breach of contract arises under the contract itself.
According to Mr. Whatley, the arbitration requirement in paragraph 9(m) does not

matter. Mr. Whatley argues that he is immune from the arbitration provision because none
of his causes of action "arise under" the Agreement. This is so, argues Mr. Whately,
because his causes of action are styled as torts, or concern the breach of the Agreement,
and therefore cannot arise under the Agreement itself. This is all stuff and nonsense.
It is rudimentary law that a cause of action for breach of contract arises from the
contract itself. Section 1 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts says, "A contract is a
promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty." The Restatement goes
on to say, "When performance of a duty under a contract is due any non-performance is
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a breach." (Restatement, Contracts 2d, § 235(2).) Thus, a cause of action for breach of
contract arises from the contract itself.
Nevertheless, Mr. Whatley argues that a cause of action for breach of contract is
not a cause of action that would arise "under" the contract. This position flies in the face
of logic. (As an aside, one must ask what cause of action would arise "under" a contract
if a breach of contract cause does not.) In support of his statement, Mr. Whatley cites, but
does not argue, the United States Supreme Court case of United States v. Utah Const. Co.,
384 U.S. 394 (1966). Utah Construction does not say what Mr. Whatley wants it to say.
The Utah Construction case concerns a construction contract between the Atomic
Energy Commission ("AEC"), a government agency, and Utah Construction & Mining
Company, a private contractor. The contract at issue contained a dispute clause that said,
"All disputes concerning questions of fact arising under this contract shall be decided by
the contracting officer subject to written appeal by the contractor (Utah Construction)
within 30 days to the head of the department concerned (i.e., the AEC). . . . " (Id., at fn.
2.) In essence, under this provision, if a problem arose in the course of construction (e.g.,
an unforseen delay or increased costs), that problem had to be submitted to an
administrative body that would make specific findings of fact about the rights of the parties
under the circumstances. (See id., at 397-402.) However, the dispute provision gave no
authority to the governing administrative body to deal with a claim of whether the issues
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presented to it constituted a breach of contract, and, hence, it could not make a
determination as to whether either party had breached the contract.2 {Id.)
Of course, several problems arose in the course of construction, which Utah
Construction submitted to the appropriate administrative body for a determination of
rights. Utah Construction did not get the result it wanted from the administrative body and
then sued the AEC in the Court of Claims for breach of contract. (See id.) The AEC
argued that the dispute clause required Utah Construction to bring its breach of contract
cause of action before the administrative body. The Supreme Court disagreed and held
that Utah Construction's breach of contract cause of action did not "arise under" the
dispute clause that only permitted the submission of factual disputes to an administrative
body. In light of the provisions in the dispute clause, the Supreme Court held that the

2

The circumstances at issue in Utah Construction illustrate the distinction
between a determination of the rights of the parties and the actual determination of
breach of contract. In Utah Construction, a dispute of fact arose between the parties
when Utah Construction asserted it had encountered float rock in the course of
excavating and drilling which increased its costs and delayed its work. Whether the
float rock had caused the increased costs was an issue of fact that the parties were
required to put before the relevant administrative body for determination pursuant to
the dispute clause in the contract. However, whether failure on the part of the AEC to
pay Utah Construction's increased costs constituted a breach of contract was not for the
administrative body to decide. That issue was required to be put before the Court of
Claims or the District Court, which Utah Construction did. The AEC did not like this
approach to dispute resolution and argued that all of Utah Construction's claims,
whether for determination of rights or for breach of contract, were subject to (i.e.,
"arose from") the dispute clause and thus subject to adjudication by the relevant
administrative body. The Supreme Court disagreed. See generally Utah Construction.
12

Court of Claims could properly hear and adjudicate Utah Construction's breach of contract
claim. (See id., at 418.)
Mr. Whatley wants this holding to justify his position that none of his causes of
action "arise under" the Agreement.

The Utah Construction case offers no such

justification. The Utah Construction court never said that a cause of action for breach of
contract is separate or divisible from the contract itself. All the Utah Construction court
said was that the contractor was not limited to bringing its breach of contract cause of
action before the administrative body described in the dispute clause. Furthermore, the
decision is limited in scope to a specific dispute clause in a government contract that
expressly provided for the administrative adjudication of the rights of the parties.
Unlike Utah Construction, the Agreement at issue here is between two private
parties and does not contain any provision requiring a separate adjudication of rights by
an administrative body.3 The arbitration clause at issue here is perfectly clear on its face:
any dispute that arises from the contract must be submitted to arbitration. Mr. Whatley's

3

For the Utah Construction case to apply here, the arbitration clause would have
to essentially say that if a dispute arose between the parties as to a material fact, that
dispute must be submitted to arbitration, but the issue of whether the dispute regarding
that fact rose to the level of a contract breach could only be decided by a court of law.
The arbitration clause does not say that. It simply says that any disputes that arise
under the agreement must be submitted to arbitration.
13

first two causes of action for "void contract/recision" and "breach of contract" clearly
arise under the Agreement and are subject to arbitration.4
C.

All of Mr. Whatley's other causes of action are inextricably linked to the
Agreement,
As for Mr. Whatley's other "tort" causes of action, they are all inextricably linked

to the Agreement, and, after all the camouflage is stripped away, they are all causes of
action for breach of contract as well. It has long been held that, "In characterizing a cause
of action, Utah courts look to the nature of the action and not the pleading labels chosen.
Accordingly, [Utah courts] are most concerned with the true nature of the wrong and the
injury as evidenced in the substance of the pleadings." Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864,
868 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The substance of each of Mr. Whatley's so-called tort causes
of action is that Mr. Chapman breached the Agreement.
For example, Mr. Whatley has alleged a cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duties. (Appellant's Addendum, at 17-19, \\ 61-69.) The cause of action alleges that Mr.
Chapman breached his fiduciary duties after taking over the business as trustee or receiver
on behalf of Mr. Whatley. Whatever duties Mr. Chapman owes to Mr. Whatley arise out
of the Agreement. This cause of action would not exist but for the existence of the
contractual obligations between the parties as specified in the Agreement.

4

Mr. Whatley's first two causes of action are actually one cause of action for
breach of contract. In addition, "void contract" and "recision" are remedies for a
breach of contract, not causes of action in and of themselves.
14

Likewise, Mr. Whatley's alleged cause of action for conversion/theft is tied directly
to the Agreement. The Agreement specifically outlines what assets went with the sale of
the business and what assets did not. (See, e.g., Appellant's Addendum, at 28, f 3.) Mr.
Whatley's allegation that "Chapmans have retained various items of property" is just
another way of alleging the Chapmans breached the Agreement by failing to comply with
its asset provisions. (See Appellant's Addendum, at 19, t1 71-72.)
Mr. Whatley's slander of title cause of action is also inextricably tied to the
Agreement. Paragraph 2(b) of the Agreement specifically obligates Mr. Whatley to give
the Chapmans a security interest in lots 241 and 242, Sherwood Hills Subdivision, Plat F.
Paragraph 2(c) entitles the Chapmans to receive "the entire net sale proceeds" from the
sale of the lots as partial satisfaction of the purchase price for World-Wide Photo. When
Mr. Whatley abandoned the business and stopped making payments, the Chapmans
commenced foreclosure proceedings, as they had the right to do under the terms of the
Agreement. Mr. Whatley now alleges that those proceedings constitute slander of title,
but what he is really alleging is that the Chapmans have breached the Agreement and have
no right to foreclose. Thus this cause of action is really a breach of contract cause of
action in slander-of-title clothing.
The same is true of Mr. Whatley's alleged causes of action for defamation (which
arose from a public hearing held before the Utah Labor Commission regarding a complaint
filed by one of Mr. Whatley's former employees, which employee he would not have had
15

were it not for the Agreement), tortious interference with business (the Agreement contains
a non-competition clause - see Appellant's Addendum, at 29, \ 5), and violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1030 (which is also tied to the non-competition clause of the Agreement). None
of these causes of action exceed the scope of the arbitration clause contained in the
Agreement; all of them are breach of contract causes of action; all of them "arise under"
the Agreement; and they are all subject to arbitration, just as Judge Lay cock said.
D.

Mr. Whatley's fraud allegation is not a "get out of arbitration free" card.
In addition, Mr. Whatley has alleged that the Chapmans and Mr. Christensen have

defrauded him. Mr. Whatley sees his fraud cause of action (which is divided into two
sections, "contractual fraud" and "stock fraud") as a get out of arbitration free card. Mr.
Whatley's argument is based on § 78-3la-3 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953, as
amended), which says, "A written agreement to submit any existing or future controversy
to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon grounds existing at law
or equity to set aside the agreement, or when fraud is alleged as provided in the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure." Unfortunately for Mr. Whatley, he has not alleged fraud as required
in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires Mr. Whatley to plead fraud
against each of the defendants with particularity. Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
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Procedure requires Mr. Whatley to plead fraud with particularity.5 As the Utah Supreme
Court explained in Heathman v. Hatch, 372 P.2d 990, 992 (Utah 1962),
The objective of [Rules 8 and 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure] is to
require that the essential facts upon which redress is sought be set forth with
simplicity, brevity, clarity and certainty so that it can be determined whether
there exists a legal basis for the relief claimed; and, if so, so that there will
be a clearly defined foundation upon which further proceedings by way of
responsive pleading and/or trial can go forward in an orderly manner.
In addition, it has long been recognized in Utah that where the terms " 'fraud,' 'conspiracy'
and 'negligence' are but general accusation in the nature of conclusions of the pleader
[t]hey will not stand up against a motion to dismiss on that ground. The basic facts must
be set forth with sufficient particularity to show what facts are claimed to constitute such
charges." Id., at 991. Mr. Whatley's allegations of fraud fail to rise to this level. He
has utterly failed to plead fraud against Mr. Christensen, and he has failed to do so against
the Chapmans as well.6

5

Rule 9(b) says: "In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent,
knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally."
6

Mr. Whatley attempts to show in his brief that he has pleaded fraud with
particularity by creating a table showing the elements of fraud coupled with the
paragraphs in his complaint where he thinks he has alleged particularly pleaded fraud.
(Appellant's brief, at 13.) Interestingly, four of the nine paragraphs Mr. Whatley cites
(ft 13, 18, 20 and 72) do not even appear in the context of the fraud cause of action
itself. What is more, Mr. Whatley does not cite the language of any of the paragraphs
themselves, because he knows they are too general to stand up to the particularity
requirements described in Rule 9 and in Semenov v. Hill, 1999 UT 58, 982 P.2d 578.
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1.

Mr. Whatley has no basis for his fraud claim against Mr. Christensen.

In Semenov v. Hill, 1999 UT 58, j 9, 982 P.2d 578, the Utah Supreme Court said:
Under Utah law, to bring a claim sounding in fraud, a party must allege (1)
that a representation was made (2) concerning a presently existing material
fact (3) which was false and (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be
false or (b) made recklessly, knowing that there was insufficient knowledge
upon which to base such representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the
other party to act upon it and (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and
in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon it (8) and was thereby
induced to act (9) to that party's injury and damage. (Citations omitted.)
Hence, under Semenov, Mr. Whatley must specifically plead, with respect to Mr.
Christensen: (1) that Mr. Christensen made a representation (2) concerning a presently
existing material fact (3) which was false and (4) which Mr. Christensen either (a) knew
to be false or (b) made recklessly, knowing that there was insufficient knowledge upon
which to base such representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing Mr. Whatley to act upon
it and (6) that Mr. Whatley, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact
rely upon it (8) and was thereby induced to act (9) to that his injury and damage. See
Semenov v. Hill, at if 9.
Mr. Whatley has utterly failed to plead these nine elements with respect to Mr.
Christensen (and with respect to the Chapmans for that matter).
a.

Mr. Whatley has not alleged, nor can he show that Mr. Christensen was

a party to or signed off on the Stock and Asset Purchase and Sale Agreement. There
is no nexus linking Mr. Christensen to the transaction that might give rise to the possibility
of fraud on Mr. Christensen's part. Mr. Christensen did not sign the agreement; there is
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no allegation to the contrary. Mr. Christensen only participated in the transaction as an
attorney for Mr. Chapman, no more nor less than Mr. Willardson participated as counsel
for Mr. Whatley. Both attorneys participated in drafting the agreement and in counseling
their clients. {See Appellant's Addendum, at 118-119, ft 30-31.) That the parties are
now trading allegations of breach of contract does not equate to fraud on the part of the
attorneys.
b.

Mr. Whatley has not alleged nor can he show that Mr. Christensen

personally made any sort of direct representation to Mr. Whatley himself that
induced him to sign off on the agreement. Indeed, Mr. Whatley admits in the affidavit
he filed that he has never spoken with Mr. Christensen. Paragraph 31 of Mr. Whatley's
affidavit says, "Christensen may not have met or spoken with me directly, but he did the
drafting and it was his changes that Chapman discussed with me and insisted upon
implementing." (Emphasis added.) (Appellant's Addendum at 119, f 31.) Thus, by Mr.
Whatley's own admission, the representation element under Semenov is lacking and Mr.
Whatley has no case against Mr. Christensen for fraud.
c.

Mr. Whatley has not alleged nor can he show that Mr. Christensen gave

any independent opinion or representation to Mr. Whatley on which Mr. Whatley
relied to his detriment. Perhaps if Mr. Christensen had issued an independent opinion
letter to Mr. Whatley that Mr. Whatley relied on in his purchase of World-Wide Photo,
there might be some basis for Mr. Whatley's fraud claim. There is no such letter, nor is
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there any other independent representation from Mr. Christensen to Mr. Whatley or Mr.
Willardson, for that matter, where Mr. Christensen made demonstrably false assertions
about World-Wide Photo that induced Mr. Whatley to consummate the transaction. The
opinion letter does not exist; the representations do not exist; most importantly, the
allegations do not exist. Hence Mr. Whately's cause of action for fraud against Mr.
Christensen must fail and were properly dismissed.
d.

Mr. Whatley has not alleged, nor can he show that Mr. Christensen is

part of or a front for World-Wide Photo (the company Mr. Chapman sold to Mr.
Whatley). Mr. Whatley's fraud allegations against Mr. Christensen might also make sense
if Mr. Whatley could show that Mr. Christensen was a part of World-Wide Photo (e.g.,
a shareholder) or that he had direct knowledge of the inner workings of the corporation.
There is no such allegation because Mr. Christensen is not now nor has he ever been a
shareholder in, or a part of World-Wide Photo. There is no evidence, or even any
allegation that Mr. Christensen had direct knowledge of the inner workings of World-Wide
Photo, that he was privy to the books, or knew the financial situation of the company.
Instead, Mr. Christensen did what lawyers always do - he reasonably relied on the
representations of his client in negotiating the terms of an agreement between his client and
Mr. Whatley (who was also represented by counsel through the entire negotiation period).
This does not put Mr. Christensen in a position to defraud Mr. Whatley. Mr. Whatley has
not even alleged that Mr. Christensen was somehow a "front" for Mr. Chapman. The
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allegations have not been made because the facts and evidence to support them simply do
not exist.
Rather than make any of the above showings, Mr. Whatley vaguely alleges that Mr.
Christensen has committed fraud because Mr. Christensen participated in drafting a
document and conveyed Mr. Chapman's wishes.7 This is not pleading with particularity
for the purposes of alleging fraud. Indeed, only three paragraphs in Mr. Whatley's
complaint (paragraphs 11, 49 and 56) even refer to Mr. Christensen by name with respect
to the fraud allegations. In the introduction portion of the complaint, Mr. Whatley says,
in paragraph 11:
t i l . On or about April 5, 2001, Mr. Whatley and Chapmans entered into
an agreement entitled "Stock and Asset Purchase and Sale." That document
was drafted bv defendant Christensen. . . . (Appellant's Addendum, at 3.)
Then, in Count III, labeled "Fraud,", Mr. Whatley alleges as follows:

7

Ironically, Mr. Whatley fills fourteen pages in his affidavit describing his
interaction with Mr. Chapman and describing how he thinks Mr. Chapman has
misbehaved. Then, on the bottom of the thirteenth page, comes the remarkable
statement, "Mr. Christensen has been the prime mover in all of the activities of
Defendants." (Appellant's Addendum, at 118, \ 29.) The statement is immediately
followed by, "Discovery is needed, however, on the precise extent of his
involvement." {Id.) Defendants are not aware of any cause of action for being a
"prime mover," nor does Mr. Whatley explain what a "prime mover" is.
Furthermore, the allegation in Mr. Whatley's affidavit that Mr. Christensen is the
"prime mover" is in direct contradiction to the allegation in paragraph 12 of his
complaint, where Mr. Whatley expressly says, "Mr. Chapman was, at all times
relevant hereto, and remains, the prime mover in the operation of that business.
(Emphasis added.) {Id., at 3, \ 12.) Mr. Whatley cannot have it both ways.
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149. The above actions began occurring within a very short time of signing
the agreements. Plaintiff therefore alleges, on information and belief, that
Mr. Chapman had no intention of honoring those promises at the time they
were made. Those contractual representations, warranties, and promises
were conveyed and drafted by Mr. Christensen. assisting Mr. Chapman's
fraud, (/rf., at 13-14.)
Finally, Mr. Whatley alleges in paragraph 56:
f 56. The statement that Mr. Whatley was contracting to purchase the
"outstanding shares" of the corporation appears multiple times in the
document which Mr. Christensen drafted and which the Chapmans signed.
It is entitled "stock and asset purchase and sale." Mr. Whatley requested the
stock records and corporate records and was initially told they would be
produced. Ultimately Mr. Chapman admitted there were none. On
information and belief the named defendants either knew or should have
known that the contractual representation regarding stock and corporate
records were false when made. (Id., at 16.)
In short, Mr. Whatley alleges with specificity that Mr. Christensen drafted documents and
conveyed Mr. Chapman's representations. These allegations do not begin to satisfy the
nine elements of fraud set forth in Semenov. Judge Laycock recognized the complaint
merely alleges Mr. Christensen was acting as the Chapmans' attorney and correctly
dismissed the complaint against Mr. Christensen.
2.

Mr. Whatley's fraud cause of action against the Chapmans is just
another allegation of breach of contract.

As for Mr. Whatley' fraud cause of action against the Chapmans, not only has he
failed the particularity test, the fraud cause of action is inextricably linked to the
Agreement, and is really a cause of action for breach of contract, just like all of his other
causes of action. In Records v. Briggs (see supra), the Utah Court of Appeals observed,
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The Utah Supreme Court has followed the rule that 'if the cause of action
arises from a breach of a promise set forth in the contract the action is ex
contractu (from or out of a contract), but if it arises from a breach of a duty
growing out 0/the contract it is ex delicto (from a delict or tort).' (Citations
omitted.)
Records, at 869. Mr. Whatley's fraud cause of action essentially alleges that the
representations made by the Chapmans in the Agreement were false. Thus, the fraud
cause of action is ex contractu, because it arises from the Agreement itself and, like all of
Mr. Whatley's "tort" causes of action, is just another breach of contract cause of action.
Thus Judge Lay cock held that Mr. Whtaley's so-called fraud cause of action is not a free
pass out of his obligation to arbitrate. There is no reason for this Court to depart from that
holding.
E. The Pacific Development case cited by Mr, Whatley is inapposite to this case.
Finally, Mr. Whatley argues that none of the causes of action raised in his
complaint are within the scope of the arbitrator's authority to decide, hence Mr. Whatley
is excused from arbitration. In support of this argument, Mr. Whatley has extensively
quoted Pacific Development v. Orton, 2001 UT 36, 23 P.3d 1035 (Utah 2001) for the
proposition that an arbitrator cannot give an award that exceeds the scope of the arbitration
clause. Here again, Mr. Whatley has twisted the holding in Pacific Development for his
own purposes.
In Pacific Development, the plaintiff contracted with defendant to do sewer, water
and storm drain work on two plats within a subdivision. A dispute arose between the
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parties over the amount of work performed and defendant filed a mechanic's lien against
the project and litigation ensued.

See id., at 1 2. According to Justice Durrant,

"Apparently, the underlying contract between the parties required them to arbitrate
disputes. This fact was mentioned in oral argument, although neither party has provided
an addendum of the relevant contract provision nor cited to any portion of the record
where it may be found." Id., at fn. 1.
The parties settled many of their disputes without going to arbitration, but were
unable to resolve a dispute with regard to one of the plats. The parties then entered into
a second, written arbitration agreement that limited the scope of the arbitration to resolving
the issue over one of the two plats. See id., at 1 2. After the arbitration, the arbitrator
issued an award that covered both plats. See id. Under these circumstances, the Utah
Supreme Court held that the arbitrator exceeded his authority when he issued an award for
both plats instead of limiting the award to the plat subject to the second, narrow arbitration
agreement. Id., at f 14.
The circumstances of Pacific Development are inapposite to this case. The Pacific
Development case started with a global arbitration agreement that was later revised and
whittled down to cover a very narrow issue. The arbitration clause in the Agreement in
this case is global and, by its terms, requires all disputes that arise under the Agreement
to be submitted to arbitration. As demonstrated above, all of Mr. Whatley's causes of
action fall within the broad language of the arbitration clause, and the arbitrator has
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authority to issue an award with regard to the entire case. Judge Laycock agreed and even
went so far as to say:
[T]he Court finds that it is clear, when looking at the entire complaint in
context, paragraph by paragraph, that everything Plaintiff complains of in his
complaint is based on the contract and arises under the contract. The Court
further finds that Plaintiffs argument that his causes of action do not arise
under the agreement is, in some respects, subterfuge to try to get around his
contractual obligation to arbitrate.
(Addendum Exhibit A, f 9; see also Hearing Transcript, page 59, attached to Appellant's
Addendum, at 140.) Judge Laycock was not fooled by Mr. Whatley's subterfuge. This
Court should not be fooled either.
Ill, THE COURT PROPERLY TREATED APPELLEE'S MOTION TO
DISMISS AS A MOTION TO DISMISS, NOT A MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
Mr. Whatley next argues that the lower court could not properly dismiss his
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) because the court must accept all the allegations in the
complaint as true for the purposes of Rule 12(b)(6). (Appellant's brief, at 9.) What Mr.
Whatley fails to point out to the Court is that Judge Laycock did accept all of the
allegations as true. Mr. Whatley is frustrated because he lost anyway and must now
submit to arbitration.
In the course of briefing the motion to dismiss and motion to compel arbitration,
Mr. Chapman submitted an affidavit in support of the motion to compel arbitration.
(Appellant's Addendum, at 54.) Judge Laycock purposely and expressly ignored Mr.
Chapman's affidavit and looked exclusively to the complaint in considering both the
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motion to compel arbitration and the motion to dismiss Mr. Whatley's complaint. Said the
judge:
12 [T]he Court has not relied on the affidavit of Mr. Chapman in making
its decision with regard to Defendants' motion to dismiss, but has looked to
the allegations made in the complaint, and the provisions of the contract
between the parties. Hence, the Court declines to treat either of Defendants'
motions as motions for summary judgment, and, for the purposes of this
ruling, accepts the allegations in Plaintiff's complaint as true. See St.
Benedict's Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 196
(Utah 1991) ("A rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss admits the facts alleged in
the complaint but challenges the plaintiff's right to relief based on those
facts.")
(Addendum Exhibit A, at if 2.) In substance, the facts that arise out of the complaint
which must be taken as true are: 1) that Mr. Whatley and the Chapmans entered into an
agreement with respect to the sale of World-Wide Photo; 2) that the Chapmans have not
done all that the Agreement requires of them; and 3) paragraph 9(m) of the Agreement
requires the parties to submit "any action" to arbitration "in the event of a dispute under
this agreement." (Appellant's Addendum, at 33.) Judge Lay cock dismissed the lawsuit
and ordered the parties into arbitration because she was required to accept the facts alleged
in the complaint as true. Paragraph 9(m) requires the parties to submit to arbitration,
period, the end. There is no way to construe the contractual obligation to arbitrate in favor
of Mr. Whatley and not order the parties to attend arbitration. Judge Laycock was
therefore correct to dismiss Mr. Whatley's complaint.8
8

Mr. Whatley also argues that Judge Laycock made the wrong decision even if
the motion to dismiss is treated as a motion for summary judgment. This argument is
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IV. THE COURT'S DENIAL OF THE RULE 56(f) MOTION WAS PROPER.
Finally, Mr. Whatley argues that it was improper for Judge Lay cock to deny his
Rule 56(f) motion for additional time to do discovery. Here again, Mr. Whatley is wrong.
A.

Discovery is already occurring in the arbitration proceeding. Hence, Mr.
Whatley will not be prejudiced by the denial of his Rule 56(f) motion.
Mr. Whately's Rule 56(f) motion is a red herring. Mr. Whatley argues he has been

denied his right to do discovery due to the denial of his Rule 56(f) motion. This is
nonsense. Mr. Whatley has every right to pursue discovery in the context of the
arbitration. The only difference between doing discovery in arbitration as opposed to a
civil suit is that Mr. Whatley can do discovery cheaper and quicker in arbitration if he is
so inclined. The arbitration is being conducted by the American Arbitration Association
("AAA"), pursuant to the commercial rules promulgated by AAA. Rule R-23 of the
commercial rules of arbitration specifically requires the parties to exchange information.9

meaningless, for the standard for granting motions for summary judgment under Rule
56(c) is the same if not lower than the standard under Rule 12(b)(6). No matter how
the Agreement is parsed Mr. Whatley cannot get around paragraph 9(m). Again, the
undisputed facts are there is an agreement that requires the parties to submit to
arbitration. The reasonable inferences drawn in favor of Mr. Whatley are that the
Chapmans breached the agreement. Therefore, under paragraph 9(m), the parties must
submit to arbitration. Judge Laycock did nothing more nor less than enforce the
arbitration agreement, as she was required to do.
9

Rule R-23 says: Exchange of Information

1. At the request of any party or at the discretion of the arbitrator, consistent with
the expedited nature of arbitration, the arbitrator may direct (i) the production of
documents and other information, and (ii) the identification of any witnesses to
be called.
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Furthermore, Mr. Whatley is permitted to do discovery in the arbitration proceeding just
as if it were a state-court proceeding, with the same rights, privileges and restrictions.
Mr. Whately is not prejudiced at all by the denial his Rule 56(f) motion.
In fact, Mr. Whatley admits in his opening brief that he is cooperating in the
arbitration proceedings. (See Appellant's brief, at 5-6.) The arbitration is over a year old.
In that time, the parties have done substantial discovery through several document requests
and inspections10 and a final hearing date has been set and postponed twice due to the
parties desire to do additional discovery. The Chapmans have complied with each of Mr.
Whatley's discovery requests and discovery is nearing completion. The parties will shortly
be ready to reset the hearing date. There is no reason to bring the arbitration process to
a screeching halt just so Mr. Whatley can pursue his Rule 56(f) motion in the trial court
to do discovery that is already all but completed.
B.

Rule 56(f) is not a fishing licence.
In addition, Mr. Whatley filed his Rule 56(f) motion hoping to convince the court

that he should be allowed to discover what fraud, if any, was committed against him by
Mr. Christensen and Mr. Chapman. The Rule 56(f) motion is crucial to Mr. Whatley's
2. At least five (5) business days prior to the hearing, the parties shall exchange
copies of all exhibits they intend to submit at the hearing.
3. The arbitrator is authorized to resolve any disputes concerning the exchange of
information.
10

Mr. Whatley has been to World-Wide Photo's premises twice to inspect
documents in the past six months.
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case against Mr. Christensen, in particular, because fraud is the only cause of action Mr.
Whatley can pursue against an opposing attorney.11 In truth, Mr. Whatley is on a fishing
expedition to see if he can somehow prove Mr. Christensen defrauded him or participated
with Mr. Chapman in defrauding him. Utah law does not allow Mr. Whatley to do what
he is trying to do.
As observed above, Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires Mr.
Whatley to plead fraud with particularity, which he has utterly failed to do. Nevertheless,
Mr. Whatley now wants to go forward under the guise of Rule 56(f) to see if he can find
anything that amounts to fraud. Under the Heathman opinion {see supra), Mr. Whatley
is doing things backwards. The Heathman court said that a plaintiff mustfirstplead fraud
with particularity so that then "there will be a clearly defined foundation upon which
further proceedings. . . can go forward. . . . " Heathman, at 992. Mr. Whately is trying
to get to the further proceedings without first laying a clearly defined foundation. Under
Heathman, Mr. Whatley's complaint is subject to dismissal and he is not entitled to further
proceedings under Rule 56(f).

11

See 7 Am Jur 2d, Attorneys at Law, § 249: "While generally an attorney's
professional duty of care extends only to dealings with his or her own client and to
intended beneficiaries of the legal work performed, these limitations upon liability for
negligence based upon the scope of the attorney's duty do not apply to liability for
fraud. If an attorney is actuated by malicious motives or shares the illegal motives of
his or her client, the attorney may be personally liable with the client for damage
suffered by a third person as a result of the attorney's actions."
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The purpose of discovery is to obtain evidence that supports the clearly-stated
allegations in a complaint, not to try to create facts out of thin air, which is exactly what
Mr. Whatley is trying to do. As a practical matter, if this Court were to allow Mr.
Whatley to go forward and "discover" whether Mr. Christensen committed fraud when
there are no specific allegations of fraud, then every attorney who participates in contract
negotiations is subject to liability for fraud as soon as the contract falls apart. Attorneys
are in the business of drafting documents and zealously representing their clients. The
rules of ethics require such zealous representation.12 No attorney will be able to zealously
represent a client if he or she can be sued at the drop of a hat for fraud if the contract
between clients suddenly goes south.
Because Mr. Whatley has not alleged fraud against Mr. Christensen or the
Chapmans with particularity and because Mr. Whatley is entitled to do discovery in the
context of the arbitration anyway, Judge Lay cock properly denied Mr. Whatley's Rule
56(f) motion.
CONCLUSION
In April 2001, Mr. Whatley purchased World-Wide Photo from the Chapmans. A
year later, with only a few days' warning, Mr. Whately abandoned the business and
refused to pay the Chapmans as he agreed to do. Mr. Whatley then refused to participate
l2

See Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.1 (Competence) and Rule 1.3
(Diligence) ("A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.").
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in the arbitration proceeding commenced by the Chapmans as required by paragraph 9(m)
of the Agreement.

Instead, apparently pursuing the best-defense-is-a-good-offense

approach, Mr. Whatley sued the Chapmans and their attorney for breach of contract and
a host of other alleged wrongs. For some reason, Mr. Whatley believes that the Chapmans
should be held accountable under the Agreement, but he is relieved from performing under
that same Agreement. Mr. Whatley is wrong.
Clearly there is a dispute between the parties as to who breached the Agreement.
If this Court were to follow Mr. Whatley's suggestion, then the parties would only
arbitrate the Chapmans' claims against Mr. Whatley because those claims "arise under"
the Agreement, according to Mr. Whatley. The parties would then turn around and litigate
Mr. Whatley's claims, which Mr. Whatley says do not arise under the Agreement, in the
fourth district court. This solution is unworkable, not to mention unreasonable. The
Agreement requires the parties to arbitrate their disputes. This Court should not allow Mr.
Whatley to get out of that obligation where every single cause of action contained in his
complaint boils down to a simple allegation that the Chapmans breached the Agreement.
The Court should therefore deny Mr. Whatley's appeal and remand this case back to the
fourth district court pending the outcome of the arbitration proceedings.
DATED this 31st day of December, 2003.
CORBWDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN

James L. Christensen
Christopher G. Jessop
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ADDENDUM

Tab A

James L. Christensen, USB No. A0639
Christopher G. Jessop, USB No. 8542
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2705
Telephone: 801/534-0909
Fax: 801/534-1948

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

4 - ^ 7 7 ) ^ ^ r - ^ Deputy

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
BRYAN J. WHATLEY, an individual,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTIONS AND DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S RULE 56(f) MOTION

v.
Civil No. 020405636
BRUCE E. CHAPMAN, CERI
CHAPMAN, JAMES L. CHRISTENSEN,
and DOES I-V,

Judge Claudia Laycock

Defendants.

The following motions came on regularly for hearing before this Court on Wednesday,
February 26, 2003, at 10:30 a.m.:
1.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, dated January 10, 2003;

2.

Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration, dated January 10, 2003; and

3.

Plaintiffs Motion for Relief Under Rule Rule 56(f), dated January 23, 2003.

Plaintiff Bryan J. Whatley was present at the hearing and was represented by his attorney,
Timothy Miguel Willardson. Defendants Bruce E. Chapman, Ceri Chapman ("Chapmans") and

James L. Christensen were also present and were represented by their attorneys, James L.
Christensen and Christopher G. Jessop. The Court, having considered the memoranda, affidavits,
oral argument of counsel, and all relevant pleadings and documents pertaining to the motions, now
makes the following findings and enters the following order:
FINDINGS
I. The effect of the affidavits of Mr. Chapman and Mr, Whatley.
11

After reviewing the affidavit of Mr. Chapman, and considering the arguments of the

parties, the Court finds that Mr. Chapman's affidavit was submitted exclusively in support of
Defendants' motion to compel arbitration.
12

Furthermore, the Court has not relied on the affidavit of Mr. Chapman in making its

decision with regard to Defendants' motion to dismiss, but has looked to the allegations made in
the complaint, and the provisions of the contract between the parties. Hence, the Court declines
to treat either of Defendants' motions as motions for summary judgment, and, for the purposes
of this ruling, accepts the allegations in Plaintiffs complaint as true. See St. Benedict's
Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991) ("A rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss admits the facts alleged in the complaint but challenges the plaintiffs right to
relief based on those facts.")
II. Motion to Compel Arbitration
f3

According to the allegations in Plaintiffs complaint, Plaintiff and the Chapmans entered

into an agreement entitled Stock and Asset Purchase and Sale ("Agreement"), on or about April
5, 2001, that was to transfer ownership and control of a photographic business, World-Wide

2

Photo, Inc., from the Chapmans to Mr. Whatley. (Complaint, f 11.) The Agreement contains
an arbitration clause that reads as follows:
In the event of a dispute under this agreement, the parties agree that any action
brought shall be submitted to binding arbitration in accordance with the rules of the
American Arbitration Association. Such arbitration need not be conducted by the
American Arbitration Association, even though it would follow their rules.
Arbitration proceedings shall be brought in Utah County, Utah, and not elsewhere.
(Complaint, Exhibit A, f 9(m).)
f4

The Court finds that the arbitration clause is clear on its face and is binding upon the

parties.
15

The Court finds that Counts 1 and 2 of Plaintiffs complaint, titled "Void

contract/recission," and "Breach of Contract" respectively, are breach of contract causes of action
that arise under the Agreement.
f6

With regard to Count 3 of Plaintiff s complaint, titled "Fraud," the courtfindsthat Plaintiff

has made no any facts with particularity supporting the elements in this cause of action, and that
this cause of action, including the sub-cause of action for "stock fraud," is really a breach of
contract cause of action, that arises under the Agreement.
17

The Court finds that Count 4 ("Breach of Fiduciary Duties"), Count 5

("Conversion/Theft"), Count 6 ("Slander of Title"), Count 7 ("Defamation") and Count 8
("Tortious Interference With Business") are all, in substance, breach of contract causes of action
that arise under the Agreement, and that none of these causes of action would exist but for the
Agreement between Mr. Whatlev and the Chapmans.

3

|8

With regard to Count 9 of Plaintiffs complaint ("Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030") the

court finds that when taken as true, Count 9 only directly applies to the Chapmans' son, who is
not a party to the lawsuit, and that this cause of action is a breach of contract cause of action that
arises under the Agreement in any case.
K9

In addition, the Court finds that it is clear, when looking at the entire complaint in context,

paragraph by paragraph, that everything Plaintiff complains of in his complaint is based on the
contract and arises under the contract. The Court further finds that Plaintiffs argument that his
causes of action do not arise under the agreement is, in some respects, subterfuge to try to get
around his contractual obligation to arbitrate.
f 10

The Court further finds that the parties agreed to submit any action with regard to the

contract to arbitration, and that the arbitration clause is enforceable as a matter of law.
III. MOTION TO DISMISS
f 11

With regard to Defendants' motion to dismiss as to Mr. Christensen, after scrutinizing the

complaint, and putting aside the statements made in their memoranda and at oral argument by both
parties that go beyond the complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to plead the elements
of fraud with sufficient particularity to escape dismissal, which elements are as follows:
(1) that a representation was made (2) concerning a presently existing material fact
(3) which was false and (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false or (b)
made recklessly, knowing that there was insufficient knowledge upon which to base
such representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it
and (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did
in fact rely upon it (8) and was thereby induced to act (9) to that party's injury and
damage.
Semenov v. Hill, 1999 UT 58, f 9, 982 P.2d 578.

4

f 12

The Court finds no allegations in the complaint that Mr. Christensen made representations

to anyone other than his own clients, as their advisor and counsel. The only substantive allegation
made in Plaintiffs complaint is that Mr. Christensen acted as an attorney for his clients.
f 13

Consequently, the Court finds that there is no basis for the inclusion of Mr. Christensen

as a party to the lawsuit.
ORDER
Based on the Court's findings, the Court hereby orders as follows:
114

Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted with respect to Mr. Christensen for Plaintiffs

failure to plead any facts that justify Mr. Christensen's inclusion as a party to the lawsuit.
f 15

Defendants motion to dismiss is granted with respect to the remaining defendants because

the arbitration clause in the Agreement is clear on its face and enforceable against the parties.
1fl6

Plaintiffs motion for relief under Rule 56(f) is hereby denied.

1fl7

Defendants' motion to compel arbitration is granted, and, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §

78-31a-4(l), the Court orders the Plaintiff and Defendants to submit all of their claims with respect
to the Agreement, including all of Plaintiffs causes of action raised in the complaint, to
arbitration.
118

The Court has discretion under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-4 to dismiss or stay this lawsuit

pending the outcome of arbitration. Given the Court's findings, the lawsuit is hereby dismissed
as all of Plaintiffs claims arise under the contract between Plaintiff and the Chapmans, and are
subject to a valid, binding arbitration clause.

5

A

DATED this WUday of April, 2003.
BY THE COURT:

^UA^^t€^

The Honorable Judg
Fourth District Court
Approved as to form and substance:
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Defendants

James L. Christensen
Christopher G. Jessop

Timothy Miguel WiUardson,
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid,
and faxed to the following at the address(es) indicated on the //T"~day of April, 2003.
Timothy Miguel Willardson
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Facsimile: 576-1960
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MM PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, L.C.,

RULING ON DEFENDANT
CHAPMANS' MOTION TO DISMISS
CROSS-CLAIM AND MOTION TO
COMPEL ARBITRATION

Plaintiff,
V.
WORLD-WIDE PHOTO, INC., and BRYAN
J. WHATLEY,

Date: November 10,2001
Case No. 030400447
Judge Claudia Laycock
Division 5

Defendants.

BRYAN J. WHATLEY,
Cross-claim Plaintiff
V.
WORLD-WIDE PHOTO, INC., BRUCE
CHAPMAN and CERI CHAPMAN,
1

Cross-claim Defendants.
This matter comes before the Court on defendants Bruce Chapman's and Ceri Chapman's

(collectively Chapmans) Motion to DismisTMr.lJVhdiley's Cross Claims*Against Bruce and Ceri
Chavman and their Motion to CompelWbitrbdoh:^ThcsGthotions ^ere fully briefed and
submittedto'fceCourt on SaembeW 0, 2 & B & £ ^ ^ ^ ^
(Whafley) Requested oral ar^ijientJ^^^^Wotioiis^e^ourt h^beenfliorou^ily'educated by|
r,

On August 27,2003 counsellor plaintiff MM Property Management, L.C.Y a nonmoving party,fileda notice to submit for the above two motions and forclefendant Chapmans
Motion for Sanctions Against Bryan Whatley and His Counsel, Timothy Willardson. This notice
to submit was improperlyfiledearly under Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A timel)
notice to submit was filed on September 10,2003 by defendant Chapmans, which deliberately
excluded the motion for sanctionsfromthe matters submitted to the Court. As defendant
Chapmans' motion for sanctions is not presently before the Court, it will not be ruled upon.
1

the memoranda submitted by the parties, has reviewed the file of the companion case, Bryan J.
Whatley v. Bruce E. Chapman, ex. au ^our me no. UZU^UDO^O- neremaner wnauey v. L,napman),
and the transcript of the motions hearing in that same matter, andfindsthat further oral argument
is unnecessary, as these arguments regarding arbitration have heard and addressed by this Court
in the companion case. Having read the memoranda and being duly intormed therefrom, the
Court now enters the following ruling.
RELEVAIN i ^ A t 1fcana jrKUU&DUKAL JUI&IUKY

1. MM Property Management, L.C., ("plaintiff") filed this suit on July 31,2003 against
defendant World-Wide Photo (World-Wide Photo^ alleging breach of contract and the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, based on a lease agreement between plaintiff and World-Wide
Photo, dated April 2,2i)U2 and signed bv Wiiatlev in an individual capacitv.
i. w nn me consent oi w ona- w me rnoto, piaintitt mea a t irst Am enaea complaint on
June 26, 2003 that added Whatley as a defendant in the suit.
t 3.

On July 16,2003 Whatleyfiledan answer that also contained a cross-claim against v

tChatomans (who were not yet mvolved,in this lawsuit), out noteMams^aefeadant World-Wideji

ess*
4. On July 21,2003 Whatley ^filed his AnsweK&*lMW^MW^^im,

which

! ^ l u ^ a cross-claim against Chapmans'and World-lViS^li^^
2

Whatley persists in referring to his action against the Chapmans as a cross-claim, even
quoting Rule 13(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in his Opposition to Motion to Compel
Arbitration: "A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim by one party against a co-party
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action
2

5. The cross-claim asserts nine claims against Chapmans.
6. On August 7,2003, shortly after the cross-claim was filed, Chapmans filed their
Motion to Dismiss Mr. Whatley's Cross Claims Against Bruce and Ceri Chapman and their
Motion to Compel Arbitration.
7. On August 11,2003, plaintiff filed a document entitled Plaintiff, MM Property's
Answering Memorandum to Defendant's motion to Compel Arbitration^ in which it stated that it
did not oppose Chapmans5 motions for dismissal and arbitration.
9. Defendant Whatleyfiledmemoranda in opposition to Chapmans' motions on August
18, 2003 and again on August 21,2003.
10. On August 28,2003 Chapmans filed their reply memoranda.
11. Both the motion to dismiss and the motion to corrmel arbitration were qnbmitted to

the Court by Chapmans on September 10, 2003.
12. Whatley is currently involved in litigation against Chapmans in a separate lawsuit
captioned Whatley v. Chapman]fital., ourfileno. 020405636
13. me cqmpiaini mjynaueyjv.junapman,aiec^on uecember 21,2002^aU^geSitliejsame
nine claims against ^Chapmans.

or of a counterclaim therein or relating to any property'that is thelsubject matter of thg drfgifialfS
action..." The Court notes that the Chapmans are not co-parties with WhMley, wliois only a cb
party with World-Wide Photo. Whatley has properlyfileda cross-claim against co-party WorldWide Photo, but his claim against the Chapmans is a third-party claim under Rule 14 As to
third-party defendants Chapmans, Whatley is a third-party plaintiff. Nevertheless, for simplicity
in ruling on this motion, the Court will refer to Whatley's action against the Chapmans as a
cross-claim, as none of the parties has attempted to correct the record up to this point.

14. Whatley's cross-claim in the present matter is nearly identical to the claims found in
the December 21,2002 complaint filed by Whatley in Whatley v. Chapman.
15. In its April 29,2003 ruling in Whatley v. Chapman, the Court ordered the parties to
engage in arbitration for all counts of the complaint. The Court found that all of defendant
Whatley's causes of action were based upon a contract between the parties, which contained an
enforceable arbitration provision. The Court also erroneously dismissed the Chapmans and Does
I-V from the lawsuit.
16. Whatley timely appealed the Court's order compelling arbitration. That matter is
before the Utah Court of Appeals, case no. 20030481-CA.
17. On this same date, November 10,2003, the Court has issued a ruling and order in
Whatley v. Chapman, setting aside the order wrhich dismissed the causes of action against Bruce
E. Chapman, Ceri Chapman, and Does I-V. Instead, the causes of action against those
defendants are merely stayed pending arbitration. All other portions of the April 29,2003 order
remain in effect
DISCUSSION
I. Chapmans' Motion to Dismiss

Mr;mffiw'sVmimaim¥A^

Chapman
Chapmans' motion to dismiss is based SpdS^UM^Ruleldf Civil PrdceduK12(bY6) andt
the arbitration clause touna in me April :>, zuui contract, wmcn is tne subject oi mis cross-ciami;
they ask that the Court dismiss defendant Whatley's cross-claim for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. The Court finds that defendant Whatley has alleged facts and legal
4

theories that, if proven true, would entitle him to relief. Therefore, the Courtfindsno basis to
grant Chapmans' motion, based upon the strict language of Rule 12(b)(6).
However, the Court considers the doctrines of res judicata and claim preclusion with
regard to Whatley's cross-claim in this matter and his amended complaint in Whatley v.
Chapman. Res judicata and claim preclusion are doctrines recognized in Utah that prevent a
partyfromprosecuting a second action that has already been presented in a prior lawsuit. See
Snyder v. Murray City Corporation, 73 P.3d 325 (Utah 2003). A party seeking a dismissal based
upon claim preclusion must establish three elements: "First, both cases must involve the same
parties or their privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented
in the first suit or be one that could and should have been raised in thefirstaction. Third, the
first suit must have resulted in afinaljudgment on the merits." Maoris & Assocs., Inc. v.
Neways, Inc., 16 P.3d 1214 (Utah 2000).
The cross-claimfiledby Whatley in this matter involves exactly the same parties
involved in Whatley v. Chapman-Brvm J. Whatley, Bruce E. Chapman, ana L,en vjiapman.
Further, this cross-claim involves exactly^the same subject matter-the c»ffiact/!wliich was signed
April 5,2001, according to paragraph 26 of Whatley7s amended cross^laffiTiiTthis*matter and
paragraph 11 of Whatley's Amended Complaint in Whatley v. C/ra>^^RlieCourt^therefore,
finds that thefirsttwo elements of claim preclusion listed above have bo^satisfied.
The Court next considers the third element-a tmal judgment on the merits, The Court's
most recent actions in Whatley v. Chapman were its original April 29,2003 order compelling
arbitration and today's order setting aside the dismissal of the Chapmans from Whatley v.
5

Chapman, neither of which is afinaljudgment.3 Whatley v. Chapman is still open, awaiting the
arbitration results, as well as the appellate decision sought by Whatley. At the present moment,
Whatley v. Chapman has not reach a final judgment on the merits. Therefore, claim preclusion is
not applicable, and dismissal of this action is not appropriate on those grounds. The Court denies
the Chapmans' Motion to Dismiss Mr. Whatley's Cross Claims Against Bruce and Ceri
Chapman.
II. Chapmans' Motion to Compel Arbitration
The Chapmans also request that the Court order the parties into arbitration on Whatley's
cross-claim, as it did on Whatley's Amended Complaint in Whatley v. Chapman. The Court has
carefully examined Whatley's Amended Complaint in Whatley v. Chapman and the cross-claim
in the present suit and has found the causes of action to be nearly identical. Whatley's amended
complaint in Whatley v. Chapman wasfiledmonths before Whatley's cross-claim in the present
suit; however, the only changes found in the instant cioss-claim are (1) the deletion of references
to James Christensen fas per the Court's April 29.2003 order in Whatlev v. Chapman). (2) the
substitution of "cross-claim defendants" for "defendants," (3) a slight rearrangement in the ordei
of the counts, and (4) the addition oltwo paragraphs statmg that Whatley seeks indemnity in the
present suit.4

3

Whatley has appealed the Whatley v. Chapman case, even ttioughfinaljudgment had not
been entered, based upon a statutory provision in the Utah Arbitration Act thai permits appeal
from orders compelling arbitration,
4

The text of these two paragraphs is as; follows.
In paragraph 34 of count I: "To the extent that Whatley has any liability on plaintiffs
6

Even though the doctrine of claim preclusion does not apply, this Court finds that (1)
Whatley's cross-claim presents issues identical to the issues in his amended complaint in Whatley
v. Chapman and that (2) the same contractual provision requiring arbitration in Whatley v.
Chapman applies in this matter. For the same reasons relied upon in its April 29,2003 ruling in
Whatley v. Chapman, the Court will compel the parties to arbitrate the causes of action found in
the cross-claim in this matter. The Court refers to, incorporates, and attaches its ruling in
Whatley v. Chapman and the new ruling issued today in that matter to this Ruling on Defendant
Chapman's Motion to Dismiss Cross-Claim and Motion to Compel Arbitration.5 The Court
grants the Chapmans5 Motion to Compel Arbitration.6

claims, that liability is exclusively the result of the bad actions of Chapmans as outlined in all but
the last two counts below and as alleged in plaintiffs complaint, to the extent such allegations
are true as to World-Wide Photo, which is and has been under the exclusive control of crossclaim defendants here since the end of April 2002."
In paragraph 1 of the relief demanded: "A judgment for monetary damages in the amount
of all liability against Whatley as a result of the plaintiffs action here."
Neither of these paragraphs alleges new complaints or causes of action, nor do they
substantially differentiate the cross-claimfromthe complaint.
?This does not mean that the parties must submit to a second arbitrationtfnthe contract, if
has already occurred pursuant to* the order in Whatley v.
Given the
identical causes of action in the two cases, one arbitratiotfproceaure snouiasurnce.
cuui nation

6

This ruling does not affect plaintiff MM Property Management's claims against WorldWide Photo and Whatley. The Court notes that on August 11, ZUUJ plaintiff filed its response to
Chapmans' motions, which was entitled Plaintiff, MM Property's Answering Memorandum to
Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration (sic), in which it stated the following: "At this
juncture Plaintiff is content to hold its causes of action in abeyance pending the conclusion of the
arbitration set for September 9th through the 12th, 2003 on virtual identical issues raised in
Defendant Whatley's Cross Claim and therefore does not oppose Defendants Motion to Compel
Arbitration." (sic)
7

CONCLUSION
Defendant Chapmans' Motion to Dismiss Whatley's Cross-Claim Against Bruce and Ceri
Chapman is denied, and their Motion to Compel Arbitration is granted.
Counsel for defendant Chapmans is to write an order consistent with this ruling, pursuant
to Rule 4-505 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration.
DATED this 10th day of November, 2003.

Case No. 030400447
^s&jijreil''*

8

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing by faxing and mailing a true and exact copy
thereof, postage prepaid on the yx day of Qeteber, 2003 to:
James L. Christensen
Christopher G. Jessop
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2705
Timothy Willardson
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Gregory B. Hadley
2696 North University Avenue, #260
Provo, Utah 84604

j%^m^—
Deputy court clerk

9

